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INTERVIVOS AND TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS
STANLEY H. JOHNSON
of the Denver Bar
This article is intended to present in abbreviated form the
substance of a lecture before Denver lawyers and others in a
seminar concerning estate planning upon the subjects of living
and testamentary trusts. It is intended to present briefly the
various types of trusts, some of the advantages and disadvantages
of each, some of the pitfalls to be avoided, and some desirable
provisions that should be included.
By living trusts are meant those transactions where legal title
to property, and usually possession, are transferred to a trustee
during the lifetime of the creator of the trust, the creator being
commonly called the settlor or grantor. Three forms of such trusts
are presently in common usage: insurance trust agreements, in-
tended to provide for the distribution by the trustee of the pro-
ceeds of life insurance after the settlor's death; declarations of
trust, in which property in the hands of the settlor is formally
set up in trust with the settlor and possibly others as trustee or
trustees, sometimes with provisions concerning the trusteeship
and disposition of the property after the settlor-trustee's death,
and sometimes without; and the ordinary living or intervivos trust
agreements, which usually have a testamentary disposition. They
will be discussed in that order.
Such agreements are usually made as a part of an estate
plan to provide ready cash to the executor for administration ex-
penses and taxes by way of a loan from the trustee on terms within
the trustee's discretion, that is, with very low interest rates or
EDITOR'S NOTE: During the past several years, the subject
of estate planning has gained the increasing attention not only
of attorneys but also of trust officers, certified public accountants,
and life underwriters. In an attempt to gain greater understand-
ing of some of the difficult legal problems involved in estate plan-
ning as well as the role which could be played by representatives
in each of these fields, the Fourth Annual Law Institute, jointly
sponsored by the University of Denver College of Law and the
Junior Bar Sections of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations,
was devoted to the general subject of estate planning and was
presented in Denver during April and May of this year with the
cooperation of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the American So-
ciety of Chartered Life Underwriters. Both attorneys and life
underwriters addressed the institute.
The articles contained in this issue of DICTA are adaptations
of some of the lectures delivered at that institute. Unfortunately,
space limitations make it impossible to publish here all the lectures
there presented; consequently, several excellent addresses from
that institute are being held for publication in subsequent issues
of DICTA.
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none at all, and with testamentary disposition as to the proceeds
in trust for family usage. Provision may be made in such agree-
ments for the additional transfer of other property from time
to time, such as securities or real estate, which may be desirable
to include in the trust. Except in unusual circumstances, such
agreements are always made subject to amendment and revocation,
and the settlor reserves all of his original rights under the poli-
cies until his death.
Some of the advantages are: the flexibility of use of income
and principal by the trustee over and above the options provided
in the policies, and under the present interest and dividend rates,
a chance to earn more money (through sound investment by a
bank as trustee) than can be earned in the ordinary policy re-
cently issued; such portions of the principal of the trust as may
be necessary for the executor's use in paying taxes and expenses
is made readily available without losing the $75,000 exemption
under Colorado Inheritance Tax Laws for insurance payable to
beneficiaries; if the trustee's duty is merely to hold the policies
until the settlor's death and then collect and distribute proceeds,
no trustee's fee is ordinarily charged until the settlor is dead;
of course, the availability of ready cash to the executor means
that estate property need not be sold by him at an unfavorable
time and that money may be available to carry on a business of
the settlor until such time as it can be wound up under favorable
conditions.
The current annual bank fees, of recent adoption, upon all
forms of living or testamentary trusts of which the assets are
made up of securities and cash, are about as follows:
Fee
$5 per $1000 of principal value for the first $50,000....$250
$4 per $1000 for the next $50,000 -------------------------- $200
$3 per $1000 for the next $100,000 ------------------------ $300
$2.50 per $1000 for the remainder.
A distribution fee for distributing principal is charged
at the rate of 2% for the first $50,000 and 1% for the
balance. This would be applicable to invasions of the
principal for the benefit of a widow or children.
It would probably be better in drawing such an agreement
not to refer expressly to loans by the trustee to the executor, be-
cause the Inheritance Tax Commissioner might claim that the
agreement was a subterfuge to evade taxes, but a general provi-
sion for full discretion in making loans by the trustee is of course
sufficient. One of the greatest advantages is the flexibility of the
insurance trust agreement, which permits a trustee, for example,
to distribute income or principal for the education of children in
accordance with their needs of the moment instead of treating
each equally, and also paying out for emergency and medical care,
and the like.
The disadvantages of the insurance trust agreement are:
first, the additional cost of a trustee's fee, now somewhat higher
DICTA Oct., 19.52
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than formerly, which is not present in insurance options (of
course it may be avoided by using individual trustees in the family
which will not charge a fee, but investment judgment and perma-
nency of the trustee may be lacking) ; and second, the loss of set-
tlement options, since the more recent insurance policies provide
that none of the options shall be available to a corporate trustee,
but under the low earnings of most recent insurance policies, this
disadvantage is offset by the greater earning of a diversified in-
vestment program.
Except that the trustee is dealing with insurance proceeds,
the provisions of an insurance trust agreement concerning the
powers of a trustee and distribution are similar to those in the
ordinary living trust agreement and will be discussed under
that heading.
DECLARATIONS OF TRUST
Lawyers generally seem not to be so familiar with declara-
tions of trust, which may be utilized (1) to explain the uses under
which property is held by the declarer of the trust, where the
title is held by him as nominee without disclosing the trust, and
also (2) for situations where property is held in joint tenancy
and one or more of the joint tenants actually has no equitable
interest in the property but is holding it for the purpose of man-
agement or distribution-actually as a trustee. It is also useful
for making a gift enforceable. In other words, a promise to give
property or money to another is unenforceable, but if set forth
in a formal declaration of trust with a transfer by the owner to
himself or another as trustee, the gift becomes complete, unless
the declarer reserves the right to revoke it.
A declaration of trust is of course not ordinarily an agree-
ment with any person but rather a recitation in an instrument
which may be in form and effect a deed, stating the uses for which
the property is held, providing for a successor trustee in the event
of the death of the settlor-trustee, and making provision for final
distribution. An individual commonly holds title to property-
which he does not actually own, except for the record or obvious
title-under constructive or resulting trusts, or under an oral
trust agreement. If the party conveying the property under an
oral agreement in trust is dead or has no capacity to execute a
trust agreement, the person holding the title may publish to the
world and to the executor of his estate the actual circumstances
under which he holds the property, by an instrument in writing
called a declaration or a deed of trust. It is rather common to
find that a mother who has reached old age and may become senile
has placed property in her own name and that of one of her chil-.
dren in joint tenancy, under an oral agreement that the child,
upon the mother's death, shall dispose of the property for the
child's own benefit and also for others. Where this situation ex-
ists, it may be desirable that the child establish by a declaration
DICTA
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of trust exactly what the terms of the oral agreement were. This
may even include provisions for disposition of the property upon
the death of the child in accordance with the oral agreement, and
for a successor trustee. Possibly such declaration might be sub-
ject to attack by an interested relative who is not included among
the beneficiaries, but ordinarily the powers of the child to name
a successor-trustee and to set forth the distributive provisions,
following the child's death, would not be challenged.
The advantages of the declaration of trust are: the difficulty
of proving the nature of the trust by the child's executor, in the
event of the child's death, is avoided; also eliminated is the cost
of appointing a new trustee in the district court; and the nature
of the trust is defined in writing.
Some caution should be exercised in determining whether any
gift taxes should be declared and paid, and this will involve knowl-
ege of previous gifts of the original donor.
LIVING OR INTERVIVOS TRUST AGREEMENTS
The provisions of such agreements are usually applicable
also to insurance trust agreements and declarations of trust. Liv-
ing trust agreements are sometimes made without testamentary
disposition, any residue after the death of the settlor pouring into,
the settlor's estate, but this results in unnecessary administration
expense and fees. Usually, however, provision is made for dis-
tribution of the property after the settlor's death, where the set-
tlor has died without revoking the trust agreement. Such trust
agreements should only be made irrevocable where the settlor is
prepared to surrender all interest in the property, and this is
usually done for the purpose of establishing a present gift. Even
where the trust is made irrevocable as a gift to minors, if they
do not get the present benefit of the income or principal, theirs
is a future interest and not available for the annual gift tax exclu-
sion, though qualifying for the gift tax exemption. The advantage
of such a trust for minors is that it avoids the expense and nuisance
of a guardianship, or, where one of the beneficiaries may become
mentally or physically incompetent, of a conservator.
As in a will, real estate may be set up in trust for the benefit
of many persons with provisions, in the case of a residence, for
use by various members of the family, without having the title
vest in a member of the family who already has a substantially
taxable estate. It is also useful, where many persons, who would
otherwise be co-owners, are buying real estate, to place the title
in the hands of two persons as joint tenants who are actually
co-trustees. If this device is used, a partnership or corporation
with all of the accounting and tax problems, may be avoided, but
nevertheless the trustees must of course report the distribution
of income on the usual fiduciary tax form. Such agreements are
also used occasionally for trusts to vote the stock of family cor-
porations, but in drawing such agreements a reference should be
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made to the Colorado Statute on Voting Trusts, Vol. II, Colo. Stat.
Ann., chap. 41, sec. 45. See also an article in Vol. XII, DICTA, No. 6,
by Shippey.
Except in the East, where living trusts were formerly in
rather common use even by business men during their lifetimes,
the living trust agreement is ordinarily desirable for such persons
as widows who have no investment judgment, or those who desire
to provide for spouses, or minor children, during their lifetimes,
for professional and other men who have substantial incomes but
are not educated in investments, and for elderly people who may
become senile and desire to protect themselves against incapacity.
The living trust agreement has the advantage of not being so
readily subject to attack as a will, because it is set up while the
settlor is still living with many witnesses who may substantiate
his competency. It is useful also with ante-nuptial agreements,
or where a husband or wife have become estranged, in order to
place the title and management of property in the hands of a
trustee in accordance with the desires of the settlor.
There has never been a determination in Colorado as to the
rights of the wife to elect to take half of an estate set up by a
husband in trust against her interests, although an Illinois de-
cision set aside such a trust, as an attempt to evade the wife's
right to elect to take a portion of the husband's estate. The Colo-
rado statute on election is restricted to wills and estates, and
where a settlor, for example, is providing for his children by a
previous marriage, it is quite possible that the court would not
permit the wife to invade the trust created by the settlor for such
a worthy purpose during his lifetime. This would be particularly
true under an ante-nuptial agreement entered into between hus-
hand and wife permitting the husband to dispose of some or all
of his property for the benefit of his children by a prior marriage.
The chief advantage of the living trust is of course the avoidance
of the waste of time, money, and trouble of probate or administra-
tion proceedings in court.
There are some drafting problems in connection with living
trust agreements. Care should be exercised as to what portion of
estate, inheritance, and income taxes are to be paid from the trust
estate, and whether such payments should be made from income
or principal, or both. The draftsman should decide whether the
trust fund should pay for such taxes only against the trust estate
or whether the trustee should be given discretion to pay such taxes
against the estate of the settlor also. Disposition of chattels under
such a trust agreement is difficult, because such property may not
easily be transferred to a trustee during the settlor's lifetime.
Banks are usually averse to accepting responsibility for personal
property not within their control. If the settlor has an interest in
a partnership, he should be advised whether or not it is desirable
to authorize the trustee to leave assets in the partnership as a
limited partner, at least for a time after the settlor's death. This
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will depend upon the earning power of the partnership and whether
the settlor's interest therein may be readily disposed of. The
living trust agreement is sometimes desirable for the transfer
of stock in a closely held family corporation in order to prevent
dispersal of its stock upon the settlor's death among a number of
minor descendants or the spouses of descendants of the settlor.
Some pitfalls exist among the distributive provisions of a
living trust agreement and of a testamentary trust. For example,
in providing for the surviving spouse, in order to take advantage
of the marital deduction, one-half of the adjusted net estate may
be left subject to the surviving spouse's distribution by will, but
the draftsman should remember that there should be deducted
from such one-half interest the value of other property specifically
given, or passing under operation of law, such as property held
in joint tenancy, life insurance which qualifies, and other assets.
This is only of importance, of course, where the surviving spouse
already has substantial property subject to death taxes. The fund
set up to take advantage of the marital deduction should be set
up as a separate fund and all taxes and expenses of the trust paid
out of the residue, so as to take full advantage of the marital de-
duction. The surviving spouse must receive all of the income from
the marital deduction fund at least annually and must have the
right of distribution at least upon death by will. It is better to
make such power one of appointment by will, because then, if the
surviving spouse does not exercise the power, the settlor's pro-
visions as to how the property shall, be distributed may become
effective. Caution should be exercised to make certain that all
life insurance policies and annuities which should qualify for the
marital deduction and which are under option for the benefit of
the surviving spouse also pour into the surviving spouse's estate
any unused portions of the insurance funds.
The marital deduction fund will still qualify, even though
provision is made for the divesting of the property from the sur-
viving spouse and into the children, in the event that deaths of
both spouses occur from a common accident, or the surviving
spouse does not survive six months after the settlor's death. The
draftsman should be careful however not to qualify that portion
of the trust by terminating it upon the spouse's remarriage, or
upon any other condition, since there can be no strings upon the
surviving spouse's power of disposition by will, if the fund is to
qualify for the marital deduction.
The balance of the trust fund may be set up as a separate
fund from which the income is payable to the surviving spouse
for life without any death tax against the surviving spouse's estate,
but if the trustee is to have power to invade the principal of the
second fund, this power under the recent federal statute should
limit the invasion to a fixed standard of living, or a fixed amount,
or to $5000 or five per cent of the value of the principal of the
trust fund, whichever is less, within any one year. See Internal
Revenue Code, Title 26, Sec. 811, and the 1949 Amendments in
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the Pocket Supplement. So far as the power of appointment to
the surviving spouse is concerned, it may be given also in con-
nection with the second trust fund without an estate tax being
imposed, providing it is a special power; that is, exerciseable only
as to the descendants or spouses of descendants or in conjunction
with a co-donee who has an adverse interest. See the 1949 Amend-
ments to Sec. 811 f. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Special powers are not exempt
under Colorado Inheritance Tax Law, Colo. Stat. Ann., chap. 85,
sec. 12. But a release of the power may be made without liability
for the tax, chap. 128A, secs. 1 to 9.
An advantage of the special power of appointment to the
surviving spouse is that it gives the surviving spouse power to
distribute at a period much later than the settlor's death in many
cases, in accordance with the then needs of the descendants or
others. But the same power may be granted to the trustee itself
by broad powers of determining the distribution of assets among
children. It is not at all necessary that the children should take
the funds equally, but the trustee may be empowered, for example,
to provide as much money as may be necessary from income or
principal for each child until the youngest has attained a certain
age or has completed his education, and then the funds may be
distributed equally among the children.
Where each spouse has substantial income, it may be well to
provide in the trust agreement that the income from the second
fund in which the surviving spouse has only a life interest should
only be paid to the surviving spouse upon his or her written re-
quest, and any income not actually utilized be paid to other ben-
eficiaries, such as the children. This may avoid getting too much
income into the hands of the surviving spouse and accomplish
an income tax saving. Before the marital deduction is utilized, it
is necessary to know what property the surviving spouse is likely
to have at death besides that property provided in the trust and
to calculate as nearly as possible the estate and inheritance taxes
against the surviving spouse's total estate and the possibility of
the surviving spouse getting rid of property during his or her life-
time by gifts or expenditures. Sometimes, however, particularly
where there are no children, the spouses may not be interested
in death tax savings, or the death taxes may be avoided upon the
death of the survivor by charitable distributions.
Ordinarily, the American business man seems to have no in-
terest in providing in his will or trust agreement for the spouse
of his own child. If that spouse is a woman and mother, the attor-
ney should emphasize to the settlor the lack of wisdom in making
provision only for the settlor's grandchildren in the event of the
death of the settlor's son, without any provision for the care of
the mother of the children.
Where grandchildren become the beneficiaries of the trust, it
is perhaps better, unless the trust fund is a very large one, to have
the principal distributed to them outright, at least upon attaining
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majority, because of the expense of trustee's fees in perpetuating
a small trust. Here it is all the more important to provide that
the trustee may distribute to a parent or one acting in loco parentis
to avoid the expense and nuisance of guardianship. Where grand-
children are involved and the trust is to continue, it would seem
much better that the trustee be given power to discriminate among
the grandchildren according to their educational needs, rather than
to disperse the income and principal equally.
One common pitfall in trusts where distribution is to be made
to children at different ages (as, for example, half of the principal
to a child at age 25 and the remainder at age 30) is the failure to
provide for distribution in the event that the child never lives to
attain the age of final distribution. The attorney should ask him-
self at each step in drafting a trust agreement whether he has
made provision for every contingency that might occur. The set-
tlor or testator may tell him only that he wants half of his prop-
erty to go to his present wife, and half to his children by a previous
marriage, and that is as far as his mind takes him. The attorney
must then drag out of him what provision he wishes made in
case his children do not live to receive final distribution, or have
no descendants, or any spouse surviving, as well as for the possi-
bility that all of the beneficiaries whom the settlor names may be
dead before the trust has terminated.
Practically, it is a good idea often to authorize the trustee
to use principal in a certain amount or at the trustee's discretion
for children who have passed majority, in order that they may
buy a residence or establish themselves in a business, rather than
receive all of the principal at fixed ages. The trust may well pro-
vide for the payment of the last illness and burial of the surviving
spouse and leave to the trustee's discretion whether any of the
debts of the surviving spouse may be paid. The spendthrift trust
clause should always be inserted in a trust agreement, because it
has been approved in Colorado and may save a prodigal beneficiary
from disaster. Care should be taken to avoid a violation of the
rule against perpetuities, particularly where unborn grandchildren
are involved, by making the trust ultimately distributable not
later than 21 years after the death of some persons then living.
Specific bequests and devises may be made in a trust agree-
ment, but it is usually better to make such bequests after the death
of the surviving spouse rather than before, in case the trust should
not be more than enough to support the surviving spouse.
So far as trustees are concerned, it is cheaper to use members
of the family or individuals, but in that event there should always
be two, and always a provision for a bank to succeed as trustee
upon the deaths of the individual trustees. The trust should ex-
pressly state that any successor has the same powers and discre-
tion of the original trustees, and the power to appoint another
successor. However, the permanent ability of banks to protect
investments is usually paramount in a trust of this kind. If an
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individual and bank are named as co-trustees, the agreement should
provide that the bank should have possession of the assets, because
this is required under banking laws, but the matter of the ex-
penditure of principal, where there is disagreement among the
co-trustees, may be left to the individual trustee rather than to
the bank, because it is probable his knowledge of the family needs
is greater. The trust agreement should always provide that the
trustee shall have power to sell real estate or personal property
without order of court, where real estate is, or may become, a part
of the assets.
Where distribution is to be made to children or grandchildren
at certain ages, it is well to have their birth dates set forth in the
trust agreement and made conclusive upon the trustee, in order
to save the trustee the trouble of obtaining evidence of birth dates.
If there is any possibility of the settlor having unborn children,
provision should be made for their sharing in the trust also. The
usual clauses governing the powers of the trustee may be obtained
from any of the trust departments of the banks. The clause giv-
ing the trustee power to determine how disbursements shall be
credited between income and principal is an important one, be-
cause there is more likely to be a contest between beneficiaries
over this subject than perhaps any other in the trust agreement.
The trustee may be given the right, in the event of dispute, to deter-
mine allocations and apportionments as between income and prin-
cipal according to the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, which is
pretty detailed in this connection, in order to avoid the expense
of a court contest.
A settlor may wish during his lifetime to control the trustee
in the sale or purchase of investments, or have his wife or some-
one else do so after his lifetime, and such a provision may, of
course, be inserted. If the trust is to be subject to revocation there
should be a clause expressly so providing, because without it the
instrument is presumed to be an irrevocable trust. The provision
should be for the right of revocation or amendment from time to
time. The trustee should be required to report to the adult bene-
ficiaries concerning assets and disbursements and there should be
a reasonably definite clause concerning the trustee's fees.
Settlors at times desire to leave from the residue of the estate
certain definite amounts to certain persons or institutions. This
should be discouraged and the distribution should be made in per-
centages or shares because of the fluctuation in the value of the
assets from time to time.
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS
Most of the comments above are applicable to testamentary
as well as living trusts, and no additional comments seem to be
called for under this heading, except to stress the fact that, if the
testator is dead, there can be no revocation or amendment, and




Some mention, perhaps, should be made of foreign real estate
in connection with the selection of a trustee and with charitable
devises or bequests.
Where real or personal property is owned by the testator in
a foreign state, ancillary administration is usually necessary and
the will should provide for an ancillary, as well as domiciliary,
executor. Whether an ancillary trustee should also be selected
will depend upon the laws of the foreign state. Some states, as
California and Kansas, do not permit foreign banks to qualify as
trustee, or hold title to real estate. Some do not even permit a
non-resident individual to qualify as executor. Furthermore, there
are laws in some states limiting the amount of the estate or trust
estate which may be left to charity. Where only personal prop-
erty is situated in the foreign state, the problem is not so great,
as in the case of real estate. Before the will is drawn these laws
should be carefully examined. In some instances it may be better
for the testator to dispose of his foreign holdings during his life-
time, or it may be possible to have the proceeds of foreign land,
intended for charity, distributable to an individual, who in turn
by separate trust agreement, agrees to distribute the proceeds
upon receipt to the charity involved.
Canadian stocks and bonds are a nuisance because of the
necessity in an estate of returning succession duty returns both
to the province of incorporation and to Canada, and paying a tax.
It is the author's hope that some of these suggestions may be
helpful to those lawyers who have not had much experience in
the drafting of trusts. They are not intended, of course, to cover
all of the problems which may arise.
SUPPORT AMENDMENT NO. 1
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 will be on the ballot in the
November general election. The provisions of this amendment are
non-controversial and its passage will cure three ills now afflicting
our judicial department. The measure has the support of both
political parties, is endorsed by the District Judges Association
and County Judges Association and is a small but vitally impor-
tant part of the judicial reform program of the Colorado Bar
Association. We know of no opposition to this measure but
energetic support must be given by every lawyer and lover of good
government to secure an affirmative vote on the amendment and
to overcome the strong tendency of electors to vote against all
constituional changes. Take time to explain the purposes of this
amendment to every voter whenever and wherever an opportunity
presents itself. The text of Constitutional Amendment No. 1 and
an explanation of its provisions may be found at page 338 of
the September, 1952, issue of Dicta.
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THE ROLE OF THE LIFE UNDERWRITER
IN ESTATE PLANNING
LOUIS C. HALLEY
Ediucational Director, Colorado Life Underwriters
The life insurance industry and the method of marketing
life insurance have, in the last century, traveled a long road-a
road which has been filled with changes. We underwriters today
have the benefit of these changes-all of them for the betterment
of the business-until today the educational process of a life in-
surance man lasts from the day he enters the business to the day
he dies. There have even been set up training standards which
lead to the attainment of a recognized professional degree. It is
interesting to note that, in securing that degree, the recipient
agrees to follow the principles which are laid down by the Golden
Rule.
Perhaps the most widely recognized estate planner living in
America is Mayo Shattock. Mr. Shattock has written several text-
books on estate planning. He likes to think of a man's estate being
arranged by a four man team consisting of an attorney, a trust
officer, a certified public accountant and a life underwriter. Nat-
urally the captain of that team would be the attorney.
In my preparation for this article a lot of research has been
done, and one fact stands out above all others-the need for co-
operation between attorneys and life underwriters. I realize that
the comparison which I make is very unfair, since an attorney
cannot go out and aggressively sell his business of practicing law
and making wills with the same determination and persistency
we use in selling life insurance. I was astounded to learn that
there were some 2,000 attorneys in the State of Colorado. On the
other hand I understand there are some 600 full time life insur-
ance men (excluding part time agents). Again delving further
into the results attained by these two groups of people, I found
that about 50 per cent of the people who die in Colorado die inte-
state, whereas only five per cent of the people who die in Colorado
die without life insurance. As stated above, I realize that this
is an unfair comparison, however, I cannot help but point it out
because the two groups working together can eliminate this con-
dition.
The day is past (or at least certainly should be) when a client
will walk into an attorney's office and say, "I want to draw a will"
to which the attorney replies, "Fine what do you want in your
will?" In an article appearing in the American Bar Association
Journal for December, 1950, it is pointed out that if the. client
had known what he wanted in his will, he would not have had to
come to an attorney in the first place.
To integrate life insurance into estate tax planning requires
a good deal of acquaintance with the intricacies of the life insur-
ance contract itself. For our purposes, particular emphasis should
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be placed upon the various income settlement options selected by
the insured for a beneficiary where the proceeds are held on deposit
with the insurance company, and will also involve questions per-
taining to the ownership of various types of contracts. The latter
may arise where there has been an irrevocable designation of
beneficiary or absolute assignment of the policies. Then, too,
special rules applicable to life insurance, endowment, and annuity
contracts are provided under specific sections of the Internal Rev-
enue Code for ascertaining the federal estate tax liability of policies
which the insured does not own, although includable in his gross
estate at death, if the Internal Revenue Bureau can sustain a con-
tention that the insured paid the premiums even indirectly. Your
qualified life underwriter is familiar with all of these items and
can furnish the answers to the questions of the attorney quickly.
I was very impressed by all of the speakers on your recent
institute program in their talks when they settle mythical estates
of $200,000, $300,000, $500,000 and even $1,000,000. I cannot help
but believe that the little man, the man who dies leaving an estate
of $10,000 or $15,000 is more in need of the joint services of the
life underwriter and the attorney. These smaller estates which
have been built up perhaps at even a greater cost in time and effort
than your huge estates, show the necessity of estate conservation
even more than does the larger estate. I cannot help but feel that
$500 shrinkage to the family of a decedent who died leaving an
estate of $10,000 means more to that family than $100,000 does
to the estate of a man who left $1,000,000.
COOPERATION NEEDED
I appeal to the entire membership of the Bar Association for
more cooperation between attorneys and life underwriters. It can
and must be accomplished. If we, in the life insurance business,
knew that by going to an attorney, our interests would be as much
protected, as one attorney going to another attorney, these little
men would be crowding attorneys' offices to get their affairs in
shape. You see, we are all working toward the same end, although
we start out with entirely different objectives. In order for you
to settle a man's estate, he must first of all have an estate. We,
on the other hand, go out and by the single stroke of a pen, create
estates where none had existed before.
Some eight or nine years ago I had an experience about which
I would like to tell you. It involved an attorney and myself and
was just one of those things that should never have happened.
I was an agent in St. Louis, Missouri, and I prepared the death
claim papers on a life insurance policy involving payment of
$75,000. This was not this man's entire estate, nor was it all of
the life insurance that he had. After I had the undertaker's (they
call them morticians now) paper completed, the doctor's paper,
and the claimant's statement filled out, I talked to the widow about
her future plans for this money. She then told me that her hus-
band had always singled out this $75,000 policy to be divided
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equally between their three minor children. She also told me that
she was going to withdraw this $75,000 from the life insurance
company as she thought the 31/2 per cent interest guarantee was
inadequate. I came back with the idea that if she were to invest
$38,000 of this money in a single premium life policy, we would
insure her life for $75,000, and she could name the three children
as joint beneficiaries. This would leave her $37,000 which she
could even lose and she would still have carried out her husband's
wishes. She agreed to this proposition, so I took her application,
and she promised to be examined the next day. The next afternoon,
she called and told me she was not going to buy the insurance.
She had been to see her attorney, and he told her the company I
represented was no good. I told her I would be happy to place
the insurance with any company her lawyer recommended. She
then told me her lawyer had already sent out an agent of another
company. He had taken her application and was waiting for her
at that time to take her to the doctor to be examined.
If we, the life underwriters, and you, the attorneys, were to
share in the type of cooperation which I am appealing for, who
would benefit more? The attorney? The life underwriter? I don't
believe so. I think it would be our clients.
I would now like to ask you to permit your imagination to
go with me to a wedding. Someone once asked for a very simple
explanation, in one sentence, of just what estate planners do.
Here is a good definition: "Estate planners are individuals who
wed a collection of assets with a collection of objectives and do
everything possible to make the marriage a happy and fruitful
one."
OBJECTIVES OF ESTATE PLANNING
In the course of this duty, estate planners perform some rather
unusual services. They must first hunt for the objectives. These can
be very elusive. Sometimes it's necessary to leap in the air to
bring them down to earth, other times they are found almost suf-
focated beneath a mass of everyday routine activities. But when
they are finally found and harnessed, they generally involve solu-
tion of the following problems for the client:
1. When and how I plan to retire and how much I will need
at that time.
2. What I would like my children to have for educational,
dowry or business purposes. Special bequests for others.
3. What I would like to have on hand as a fund for emer-
gencies or special opportunities.
4. What I want to do about my business interest to safeguard
my family and my faithful employees.
5. What I want my family to have when I die.
Now that we have formulated the objectives (brides), the
estate planner is faced with the much more difficult task of find-
ing, rehabilitating and introducing the assets (grooms) to the
objectives. Then we bring the preacher (attorney) into the pic-
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ture. Perhaps the best man (the life underwriter) was the first
to call on the minister to make him aware of the budding romance.
The minister then becomes the master of ceremonies, and he inter-
views the parent, otherwise known as the client, about the honor-
able intentions of the bride and groom. Assets will take almost
any possible shape and are not always recognized as such by their
owners. This is the preacher's job. What form might they take?
Well, they might be bonds, stamp collections, or life insurance poli-
cies. Perhaps the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policies
are already dead. Perhaps the settlement option which has been
selected is no longer appropriate, and perhaps a change of plan
might be necessary, or it's entirely possible and probable that there
is not enough of this one particular asset which provides the ulti-
mate in liquidity, and the life underwriter (best man) must be
consulted. Sometimes the assets even take intangible forms, such
as good will or some highly specialized talent. A surgeon's hands
are only assets so long as he is able to use them. Other assets, for
instance, life insurance, again come into being or increase in value
when death of the owner occurs.
After locating these assets, the attorney must make certain
that they are in sufficient quantity and in proper condition for
the prospective brides. He might look at the government bonds, real
estate, and business interests; one by one they must be thoroughly
dusted off, X-rayed, and treated until they are in good physical
shape. Sometimes it is wise to acquire more of one particular asset
with qualities that the others do not possess. Again, sometimes
assets such as business interests are discovered to. be secretly plot-
ting to stray from home the moment the parent dies. These plots
must be frustrated forever.
The minister, after interviewing the prospective bride and
groom, unites them in holy matrimony, but this job does not end
there. Frequent visits are necessary to keep the married couple
happy because now a collection of assets and a collection of objec-
tives that might never have met are united. The best man also
pays frequent visits because births, deaths, changing conditions,
or a change of business interests might require his further services.
The foregoing illustration is for the little man with a $10,000
or $15,000 estate. If the parent is a wealthy person, additional
consultation is needed-perhaps groomsmen will be added to the
ceremony in the form of accountants and trust officers. This team
must realize that team work is essential for a happy marriage and
should lend every cooperation with each other to assure a long,
happy married life.
In closing I would like to repeat---estate planning consists of
team work. It consists of the whole team fighting to benefit the
client. With cooperation between the attorney and the life under-
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Since other papers published in this series deal with the im-
portant and complicated problems of tax minimization and the
creation of trusts (including testamentary trusts), we shall confine
this paper to the comparatively simple problems of will-drafting
in general. Even though the matters discussed will probably be
familiar to all attorneys, a summary of common pitfalls with
some reference to Colorado law should be of value. Mistakes in
the preparation of wills are more apt to be due to oversight than
to a lack of knowledge of the law. Every attorney should build
up a check list of points to be considered in drafting wills and
should from time to time refresh his memory by reading or reread-
ing a good book on estate planning.'
NECESSITY FOR A WILL
A will is usually desirable. In many cases it is important for
a man to disinherit children and leave all his property to his widow.
Even if a client desires his property to go to his heirs at law, a
will is usually desirable. Where minors are involved, a will can
obviate the expense of a guardianship by the creation of a simple
trust to handle the minors' property until the age of 21 years.
Even if there is no possibility of minor heirs, a will usually pro-
duces a better, cheaper result than an intestate administration.
The will can assure a qualified executor, the elimination of the
expense of a bond, savings by distribution in kind, and a more
expeditious and efficient disposition of assets through sales with-
out court order.
Of course all administration and administration expense may
be avoided if a man arranges his affairs so that he dies with no
property worth over $500, except insurance policies payable to
named beneficiaries, property owned in joint tenancy, a joint bank
account, U.S. bonds issued in two names and property held in an
intervivos trust.2 Under some circumstances this plan will be
preferable to a will, but it has its dangers. It precludes the flexi-
bility usually desirable in an estate of substantial size. Even in a
small estate it frequently is unsuccessful because some asset re-
quiring administration has been overlooked.
'See check list of Hubert D. Henry, 27 DICTA 273 (1950).
The following books are very helpful:
Harold Schwarzberg and Jules E. Stocker, Drawing Wills. (Practising
Law Institute, 1946.)
Harrison Tweed and William Parsons, Lifetime and Testamentary Es-
tate Planning. (American Law Institute, 1951.)
Joseph Trachtman, Estate Planning. (Practising Law Institute, 1949.)
Mayo Adams Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook. (Little, Brown
& Co., 1948.)
2 See, Merrill A. Knight, Simple Devices for the Transfer of Assets Without
Administration, 27 DICTA 277 (1950).
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In many situations a joint tenancy is undesirable because the
parties may have friction or a divorce, the financial or personal
factors may change, and if the property increases in value, the
survivor will have a greater capital gains tax on the sale of the
property than if it were received by inheritance or by will.
There is some danger in a joint bank account. In a recent
Colorado case,3 the decedent had put money in a joint bank account
in the names of the decedent and friend A, with an agreement that
A was to withdraw the money only after decedent's death and
then was to distribute it to certain of decedent's relatives. The
court held that the device was a testamentary plan and invalid
and that the bank account passed as intestate property. Appar-
ently, a joint bank account will pass the property to the survivor
in the ordinary situation where both parties draw on the account
and the survivor is under no obligation to dispose of the proceeds
to other persons. This case at least casts doubt on the effective-
ness in Colorado of the so-called "Totten trusts," e.g., where de-
cedent deposits money in a savings bank "in trust for" some other
person.
Will or no will, some money in a joint account or some insur-
ance proceeds may be desirable to provide ready cash for living
expenses during the period of administration.
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF WILL-DRAFTING
A testator often thinks he knows just how he wants his will
drawn, but more often than not his preconceived ideas will not
carry out his real desires and purposes. The attorney's function
is not to tell the client what to do with his money, but to advise
the client how to do what the client wants to do with it. To do
this the attorney must know all the facts-facts regarding the
client's family, the amount and nature of all the client's assets,
in whose name or names title is held, the client's probable debts,
the financial situation of intended beneficiaries, and what prop-
erty is to be received by beneficiaries outside of the provisions of
the will (such as joint-tenancy property, life insurance proceeds,
U.S. bonds in two names and trust funds). The attorney must
also be informed of any substantial gifts made or trusts created
by the client which might be subject to estate or inheritance or
gift taxes. The client should be advised as to the probable shrink-
age in his estate due to taxes and administration expenses, and
should be informed of the advisability of having sufficient life
insurance proceeds or other liquid assets available to the executor
to pay all taxes, expenses and debts, and of having ready cash
available to the family for living expenses.
If the attorney knows all the facts, it is comparatively simple
to draw a will which will carry out the testator's desires if the
testator dies immediately. But the testator may not die for many
years, during which time his financial and family situation may
'Urbancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 226 P. 2d 316 (1950); noted in 23 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 349 (1951).
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change very materially. Most testators fail to appreciate all of
the contingencies which may arise before death or during the
period of administration. Many testators are unconcerned by the
problem of changed circumstances, because they are sure that they
will make new wills whenever necessary. Experience shows that
all too frequently a testator neglects to make a new will even when
it is essential. It is possible that the testator may be prevented
from making a new will by mental incapacity. For these reasons
the attorney should consider all likely contingencies (such as the
testator's divorce, an increase or decrease in assets or debts, a
change of the form of assets owned, a change in the purchasing
power of money, a change in the family situation, the birth or
adoption of children, the possible marriage or divorce or death of
a beneficiary), and should draw a will which will probably carry
out the desires of the testator under whatever circumstances may
exist at the date of death. This is a difficult task; of course it is
impossible to draw a will which will be the most desirable will
under every conceivable set of circumstances which may arise.
Flexibility to meet changed conditions can best be obtained by a
testamentary trust with broad discretionary powers in the trus-
tee, but even when a trust is not desired, the problem must be
tackled. Probably most testators would be surprised to learn that
a divorce does not revoke a will and that a will leaving "all my
property to my wife Helen" would be effective even if Helen were
divorced from the testator at the time of his death 4 but that if
they had been divorced and were remarried at the time of his
death, the will would be invalid. 5
If the testator makes a will in Colorado and dies domiciled in
another state, the law of that state will probably apply as to the
validity and construction of the will and the administration of
the estate as to personal property wherever located; as to real
property the law of the state where the property is situated will
apply. A will can and should be drawn so that it will probably be
effective under the law of any state. As to execution, a will exe-
cuted according to Colorado law with the usual attestation clause
if witnessed by three witnesses should be valid in any state and
in most foreign countries.
It is important to provide for flexibility in the administration
of the estate. In most cases it is advisable to give the executor
power to sell real or personal property without order of court,
power to retain an asset of the estate even if retention will result
in lack of adequate diversification, and power to distribute in kind.
If there is a likelihood of the testator's owning a business at his
death, the will should provide under what circumstances and for
how long the executor may continue the business and what funds
may be used for this purpose. Our present Colorado law gives
broad investment powers, but if the law of some other state may
apply, investment powers should be set out in the will.
Semble, Moore v. Handley, 97 Colo. 258, 48 P. 2d 808 (1935).
In Re Estate of Matteote, 59 Colo. 566, 151 P. 448 (1915).
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Under a given set of circumstances probably no two attorneys
would give identical advice, and probably no two testators would
want exactly the same will. The will must be "tailor-made" to fit
the circumstances and desires of the particular testator. A very
short, simple will may be the solution, but the result should be
reached only after consideration by the testator and the attorney
of all the factors involved. The promiscuous use of stock forms
should always be avoided. In advising a client as to a will, the
attorney is not merely solving legal problems, but is helping the
client solve problems regarding the care and welfare of human
beings and should never overlook the personal factors involved.
GENERAL LEGACIES
Unless the testator is sure that he will die very shortly, it is
dangerous to leave general legacies of substantial sums of money.
For example, a testator with $1,000,000 makes a will leaving $100,-
000 to X University and the residue of his estate to his family.
If he meets financial reverses and dies with only $100,000, his
family will receive nothing. A safeguard against such a conting-
ency is to leave $100,000 to X University, provided that if this
sum exceeds 10% of the net estate, the gift is to be cut down to
10% of the net estate. On the other hand the testator may wish
X University to receive more than $100,000 if his estate is larger
than $1,000,000. In that event he can leave 10% of his net estate
to X University.
Here lurks a great danger. Assume that a testator wishes to
treat his two sons equally and leaves Blackacre to his farm-minded
son A and an equal value of specific corporate stock to son B. If
oil is struck on Blackacre and the stock depreciates in value, the
testator's main object is defeated. Furthermore there is the danger
of ademption; if the testator sells Blackacre or trades it for White-
acre or if it is taken on condemnation proceedings, A gets nothing.
Similarly B's gift may be defeated if the testator sells the stock
or if it is exchanged in a reorganization or merger for new stock
which the court feels is a change in substance rather than in mere
form. Even a stock dividend may cut down the value of B's gift.
A gift of "10 shares of X stock" will be treated as general and
not subject to ademption, whereas a gift of "my 10 shares of X
stock" is a specific gift subject to ademption. 6 It is much safer to
give the principal beneficiaries fractional shares of the estate or of
the residue than to leave them specific gifts of the major assets.
While specific gifts of major assets are to be avoided, property
having primarily a sentimental rather than monetary value (such
as heirlooms, furniture, jewelry and personal effects) is usually
specifically bequeathed. Such property should not be allowed to
pass into a trust fund, nor should it go into the residue as it may
then have to be sold. If such property is given to several persons
in equal shares, family squabbles may be avoided by giving the
executor broad authority as to the method of division. Frequently
'Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P. 2d 311 (1932).
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a testator wishes to have his effects divided among friends or
relatives in accordance with directions which the testator will
give after the will is executed and which may be changed from
time to time. This is clearly illegal, and there is no safe way to
accomplish this result unless the testator is willing to leave the
property outright (with no strings attached and no desires or
wishes expressed) to some person who the testator trusts will
carry out the moral obligation. Such person might be legally
bound as a constructive trustee, but this involves uncertainty as
to proof. Such a device should not be used if the property is of
sufficient value to be subject to gift taxes.
Frequently the testator will wish to make a specific gift of
the family residence rather than have it pass into the residue. If
he leaves "my residence at No. 100 Main St." and later sells it
and purchases another residence, nothing will pass. The will should
clearly state that any residence owned at the time of death is to
pass; but in wording the will, consideration should be given to
the possibility of the testator having more than one residence, such
as a winter home and a summer home. If a residence or any other
property is given specifically and there is the possibility that it
will be encumbered, it should be stated whether it is to pass sub-
ject to the lien or whether the executor is to pay off the lien from
other assets of the estate.
PRIORITY OF LEGACIES
If there are insufficient assets to pay all of the legacies, some
will be abated. The testator can provide the order of abatement.
For example, if the will leaves an automobile to A, $10,000 to B
and $10,000 to C, it may also provide that if the assets are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all three gifts, the gift to A shall abate first, then
the gift to B. This will give C the first preference and will gen-
erally be much more satisfactory than an attempt to prefer C by
the clumsy and uncertain device of a demonstrative legacy, e.g.,
"$10,000 to C, payable out of my savings bank account."
The law is not entirely clear as to how gifts will be abated
if the surviving spouse elects to take the statutory share instead
of taking under the will. The will should make it clear how the
balance of the estate is to be disposed of in this event.
LIFE ESTATES AND REMAINDERS
Where property is not to be given outright, a trust is usually
advisable. If a legal life estate and a legal remainder are created,
the will should state whether or not the life tenant is to post a
bond and is to be liable for repairs and waste. The will should also
state who is to take in the event the remaindermen all die before
the life tenant. If a remainder (either legal or equitable) is cre-
ated for a class, extreme care should be exercised in defining the
class and the time at which the class is to be determined. For
example, a gift "to A for life and then to A's children" is am-
biguous. Are children born to A after the testator's death to take?
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Do the children take a vested remainder, or is their interest con-
tingent on surviving A? What happens if A has a child who dies
before A, leaving issue who survive A?
CHILDREN, AFTER-BORN CHILDREN AND ADOPTED CHILDREN
Does a gift to "children" or "issue" or "descendants" include
adopted children? The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a
gift to the testator's children includes adopted children, but a gift
to the children of any other person does not include adopted chil-
dren. 7 The will should clearly specify whether or not adopted
children are to be included. Certainly most testators intend to
include their own adopted children. Suppose a testator leaves
property in trust for his child A for life with a remainder to A's
children. Probably most testators would wish children adopted
by A bona fide to take whether adopted before or after the date of
the will or the date of death. But the fact that an adult may be
adopted, would put A in the position of being able to make an
advantageous deal to adopt a friend and thus defeat a gift over
to other relatives of the testator.
Frequently a testator wishes his widow to take all of his prop-
erty to the exclusion of any children. In most states (including
Colorado), children born after the will is executed will take their
intestate share unless expressly disinherited, and in many states
(not including Colorado), children alive when the will is made
will take unless expressly excluded. Every will should name all
existing children (natural or adopted) and should state whether
these children and any children born to, or adopted by, the testator
after the will is made are to take or are to be disinherited. A
Colorado case 8 dramatically illustrates the necessity for such a
provision. The testator, who had a child A, made a will leaving
all his property to his wife with no mention of children. Child B
was later born to the testator who later died, survived by A, B
and his widow. The court held that A was disinherited and took
nothing, B took his intestate share of one-quarter and the widow
took three-quarters of the estate.
Whenever any person or persons under 21 years of age may
be entitled to property under a will, it is important to consider
the advisability of avoiding the expense and red-tape of a guardian-
ship of the property. This can be accomplished by a trust, or, in
the case of tangible property of no investment value, by directing
the delivery of the property to the person having custody of the
minor. If a minor is given an interest in a trust fund, the trustee
can be authorized to expend the money for the minor without a
guardian being appointed.
Ordinarily a gift to children will not include illegitimate
children. In this day of Mexican and Reno divorces of doubtful
validity, the legitimacy of children born of a subsequent marriage
Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945).
8
Lowery v. Harlow, 22 Colo. App. 73, 123 P. 143 (1912).
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may be questionable. In rare cases it may be advisable to insert
a provision to insure that such children will take regardless of
the jurisdictional infirmity of the prior divorce. 9
LAPSE
Since the anti-lapse statutes vary from state to state, it is a
wise precaution to insert the condition "if he survives me" in
connection with each gift. If the lapsed legacy is not to pass into
the residue, the will should provide specifically who is to take in
case the legatee predeceases the testator.
RESIDUARY CLAUSE
Unless the will expressly applies to all of the testator's prop-
erty, there should be a residuary clause so as to make sure that
there will be no intestate property. Powers of appointment are
more commonly used since the Revenue Act of 1948, so it is now
always advisable to determine whether the testator is the donee
of a power or is likely to become the donee of a power. The will
should expressly state whether it is, or is not, to operate as an
exercise of the power. A general residuary clause may be construed
as the exercise of a power. This may have unexpected tax con-
sequences. Also if the will creates trusts, they may violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities as to the appointed property, since the
period starts to run from the date of creation of the power rather
than from the date of the death of the donee of the power.
It is important to make sure that there will be no failure of
legatees under any contingency. If the will leaves the residue "to
A, B and C in equal shares" and A dies before the testator, B and
C will take only two-thirds of the residue and one-third will be
intestate property. 10 Even if the will provided that A, B and C
or such of them as survived the testator should take the whole
residue, there would be no disposition of the property if all three
of them predeceased the testator. There should be a catch-all pro-
vision stating who is to take in the event all legatees or contingent
legatees predecease the testator or all remaindermen predecease
a life tenant. The property may be left to a charity sure to be
in existence, or to the persons who Would be the testator's heirs
if the testator had died at the time of the failure of the gift.
PAYMENT OF TAXES
Regardless of all questions of tax minimization, every will
should specify how the burden of the federal estate tax and state
inheritance taxes is to be borne by the different legatees. If a
testator leaves $1,000 to A and a diamond necklace to B, he will
usually want the taxes paid out of the residue so that A and B will
receive their gifts tax-free. Consideration must be given to the
taxes on property which does not pass under the will, such as
life insurance, joint-tenancy property and inter-vivos gifts taxed
Shattuck, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 364, 365.
"Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P. 2d 357 (1950).
Feeney v. Mahoney, 123 Colo. 448, 231 P. 2d 465 (1951).
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as in contemplation of death. No general rule can be laid down
as to the best tax apportionment provision for all situations. 1
ADVANCEMENTS
Advancements made prior to the execution of a will are not
taken into account unless the will so provides. Payments made to
a legatee after the making of a will may or may not be considered
as made in satisfaction or partial satisfaction of the legacy, de-
pending on the circumstances. In some cases where property is
left to children in equal shares, the testator may want a provision
that any sum paid to any child is to be taken into account by way
of hotchpot.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
If possible, an attorney should avoid uncertainty by putting
all provisions in the will itself. Often a testator wishes to have
part of his estate added to an existing intervivos trust, and incor-
porates the terms of the trust by reference. If the trust is revoca-
ble or amendable, the gift will probably be invalid unless the will
makes it clear that the property is to be held according to the
terms of the trust as it existed at the date of execution of the will
regardless of future amendments. Gifts to charitable trusts whose
papers are filed with the Secretary of State may be made by refer-




The Colorado Simultaenous Death Act does not apply to a
situation where there is any substantial evidence that one of the
parties survived the other by even a few seconds.13 To meet this
situation, some attorneys insert a provision in the will that the
legatee shall not take if he dies as the result of a common disaster
with the testator. This provision is subject to the objections that
the cause of death is sometimes uncertain and that the survivor
may linger for an indefinite period. A provision that the legatee
shall take only if living thirty days (or any other period not ex-
ceeding six months) after the date of death of the testator would
appear to be more certain and effective. Such a clause should not
be used regarding a spouse if it is more important to get the
benefit of the marital deduction for estate tax purposes than to
prevent the property passing to the spouse's estate. It is probably
wiser to omit any provision on the subject, except in cases where
the spouses have no children and survivorship will determine
whether the property goes to the husband's relatives or the wife's
relatives.'
4
"' Trachtman, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 48-55; Tweed and Parsons, op. cit. note 1
at p. 68.
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 4, §§184-186 (1935).
11 Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P. 2d 741 (1950).
" Trachtman, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 56-63.
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MUTUAL WILLS
If two persons contract orally or in writing to make wills in
which each leaves all of his property to the other, or in which
each leaves a life estate to the other with the remainder to a spe-
cified person, the wills are irrevocable and the contracts are en-
forceable in equity. It has been held in Colorado that the simul-
taneous execution of mutual wills creates a presumption of such
a contract.15 Obviously such contracts should not be entered into
in most instances. Many husbands and wives simultaneously make
mutual wills with no intent that either party shall be under obliga-
tion not to change his will. In such case it is essential to have
some evidence that there was no contract between the parties. A
statement to this effect in each of the wills should be sufficient, if
the wills are executed in duplicate and an executed copy of each
will is retained by the attorney. This will not be satisfactory to
those attorneys who object to the execution of wills in duplicate.
If the wills are not to be executed in duplicate, or if it seems in-
advisable to put such a provision in the wills, it is a simple matter
to have a statement of the facts signed by both parties and wit-
nessed by the attesting witnesses to the wills. If such statement
is executed in triplicate and one copy kept by each party and one
copy kept by the attorney, there should be no difficulty in rebutting
this rather artificial presumption.
PAYMENT OF DEBTS
It would seem to be immaterial whether a will is silent as to
payments of debts, or directs the executor not to pay any debts,
or directs that all just debts be paid. In any event the statutes
provide for the payment of debts. A direction to pay debts should
not protect an executor who pays an invalid claim or pays a debt
barred by a Statute of Limitations or non-claim. 6 The insertion
of such a clause might open the door for the argument that the
testator intended to make the executor a trustee to pay all credi-
tors whether their claims were barred or not and whether filed
or not. If the testator wishes specific barred claims or unfiled
claims paid, he can specifically give the creditor a right as a legatee
but not as a creditor. A general direction to pay debts appears
to be futile at best and might create an uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
This paper has pointed out a few important problems which
might be overlooked, with no attempt at complete coverage or
complete discussion. I hope that the discussion has been sufficient
to illustrate the necessity for an estate plan in every case and for
the careful search for unexpected contingencies which may arise.
The exact wording of a will is also a matter requiring great care.
15Trindle v. Zimmerman, 115 Colo. 323, 172 P. 2d 676 (1946).
Hoff v. Armbruster ....... Colo ........ 242 P. 2d 604 (1952).
"Crowley v. Farmers Bank, 109 Colo. 146, 123 P. 2d 407 (1942).
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Former Judge Kettering of the Denver County Court once re-
marked that the most common weakness in will-drafting was the
inability of the will draftsman to use the English language clearly
and precisely. No will of any complexity should be signed until
at least two attorneys have checked it-every one of us occasionally
has an intellectual or linguistic blind spot. Finally, the attorney's
job is not complete unless he periodically checks the wills he has
drawn in the light of any changed conditions and reviews the
situation with his client whenever a new will may be advisable.
TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT OR
UPON DEATH
T. RABER TAYLOR
of the Denver Bar
When we talk about transfers taking effect at or upon death
we are generally talking about rich man's law. Generally we are
lalking about the Law of Trusts and the Law of Future Interests
and their impeding effect on the imposition of death taxes and
income taxes. A short translation of the terms "transfers taking
effect at or upon death" is a string between the donor and the
donee. Unfortunately, it is this string upon which has been played
the sad note of tax victories for the Government.
Any study of transfers taking effect at or upon death is also
a study of the law of the Philadelphia property lawyer. The first
inheritance tax law in the United States was passed in Pennsyl-
vania in 1862. This law anticipated the desire of Philadelphia
property lawyers to avoid the imposition of the inheritance tax
which applied to property passing at death. Accordingly, the
law imposes the inheritance tax on transfers intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or upon death. The techniques de-
veloped by the Philadelphia property lawyers were brought into
the Federal tax area with the passage of the Federal Estate Tax
Law in 1916. From the passage of the federal law on, September
8, 1916 and down to 1935, well drafted property law trusts in-
volving future interests, were successful in insulating large estates
from the federal estate tax. Some of the celebrated taxpayer vic-
tories well known to us are: Shukert v. Allen,' Reinecke v. North-
ern Trust Company,2 May v. Heiner,3 and Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Company.4 Each of these decisions, with the excep-
tion possibly of Shukert v. Allen, has been expressly overruled
either by the United States Supreme Court or by Congress. The
tide began to run against the taxpayers in 1940. You all recall
the celebrated case of Helvering v. Hallock 5 which reversed Helver-
ing v. St. Louis Union Trust Company and held that whenever
'273 U. S. 545 (1927).
2 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
3 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
4 296 U. S. 39 (1935).
'309 U. S. 106 (1940).
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there was in the decedent a possibility of reverter that the entire
estate should be subject to federal estate tax. You also recall Com-
missioner v. Church's Estate 6 in 1949 which expressly overruled
May v. Heiner. The Technical Changes Act of October 7, 1949
has repudiated Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company.
Not only clients, but also lawyers, tend to believe that prop-
erty transferred in trust with just a little string attached should
do no harm. Small lines have destroyed great ships and sent them
onto the rocks and shoals. Let us hope that none of the instru-
ments with which you and I are identified will ever put our client's
"treasure trove" into the sovereign's treasury.
To you it is obvious that "transfers intended" are found most
frequently in the pattern where the husband-father-grantor has
created trusts or made other transfers for the present or future
benefit of his wife and children. In most of the cases, the trusts
have been irrevocable trusts. However, life insurance and annuity
contracts have also run afoul of the taxing words.
Transfers intended to take effect in possession will cause heavy
imposition of death taxes because recently many advisers, lawyers
as well as life underwriters, have been near-sighted. They focused
attention on the Federal Income Tax Law. You all recall that in
1943 the Federal Income Tax Law amended Section 167 (c) for
two purposes: (1) to counteract Helvering v. Stewart;7 and (2)
in order to give income tax relief to some parent-grantors who
had created irrevocable intervivos trusts for minor dependents.
Some advisers and some lay men have been by this federal
income tax section lulled into a false sense of security. Under this
section, the federal income tax consequences are fairly clear as it
applies to one widely used type of trust clause. The section con-
tains provisions for accumulation of income during the minority
of the beneficiary with a further provision that the trustee may
apply to the use of the child so much of the income as the trustee
considers proper for education, maintenance or support. In fact,
the Federal Income Tax Regulations (Reg. 111, Section 29.167-2),
and those under the Clifford Doctrine, expressly except from their
broad scope any contention for income taxation of the grantor,
contrary to Section 167 (c), Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22 (a)-21 (d).
In passing, let us point out that the Colorado Income Tax
Law 8 has not been amended to parallel Sec. 167 (c) of the fed-
eral law.
Our focus of attention is on estate taxes. Unfortunately, we
find no counterpart of Code Section 167 (c) in the estate tax chap-
ter of the code. On the contrary, we find the dragnet trap amend-
ment of the Technical Changes Act of 1949 taxing practically all
transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death.
6335 U. S. 632 (1949).
'317 U. S. 154 (1946).
8Colo. Sec. 13(c), Reg. p. 151, Art. 13 (c).
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Every trap is designed to catch certain victims. Let us block
out the arrangements that will be trapped:
(1) The decedent transferred property in trust, to pay the
income to his wife during her life, and at her death to pay the
corpus to the decedent if living, and if not, to his children. The
decedent was survived by his wife. The value of the transferred
property, less the outstanding life estate in the wife, is includible
in the decedent's gross estate since the children cannot obtain
possession or enjoyment of the property, through ownership of
their interest, except by surviving the decedent.
(2) The decedent transferred property in trust to accumulate
the income during his life and at his death to distribute the prin-
cipal and accumulated income to his son or the son's estate. While
the decedent retained no right or interest in the property, the
transfer is taxable since possession or enjoyment of the property
cannot be obtained except by surviving the decedent.
(3) The decedent transferred property in trust, to accumu-
late the income until his son reached the age of 30, or until the
decedent's prior death. Upon the first to occur of these events the
son was to receive the corpus. The decedent's death in fact oc-
curred before his son attained the age of 30. The transfer is tax-
able under Section 811 (c) (3) (B) since the son could obtain
possession or enjoyment only by surviving the earlier to occur of
the decedent's death or the son's attaining age 30, and since the
decedent's death in fact occurred first.
Now for two arrangements that are not supposed to be
trapped:
(1) The decedent transferred property in trust, providing
for an estate for life in his daughter, and a remainder to the chil-
dren of the daughter. No part of the property is includible under
this section. The daughter can possess and enjoy the property
through ownership of the life estate without surviving the de-
cedent. The same is true of the daughter's children with respect
to their remainder interest.
(2) The decedent transferred property in trust providing for
accumulation of the income during his life, and at his death to
pay the entire fund to his children or their issue. His wife was
given the unrestricted power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust.
The wife survived the decedent and did not in fact exercise her
power during the decedent's life. Under the last sentence of Section
811 (c) (3), the transfer is not taxable since possession or enjoy-
ment of the property was obtainable during the decedent's life
through the exercise of the wife's power which was a power of
appointment as defined in Section 811 (f) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and was in fact exercisable immediately prior to
the decedent's death.
Between these two extremes is the field for caution. Seem-
ingly unimportant trust clauses deserve careful drafting to avoid
having the trust corpus subjected to estate taxation on the basis
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of a theory not readily perceived. Often the clause may even be
unessential to the grantor's purpose of setting up a trust for his
children. Even careful and informed drafting can give no abso-
lute assurance against new Congressional demands for revenue.
TRANSFERS PRIOR TO 1949
Let us try to distill from the 1949 amendment a few guide
rules to map a course free from tax traps for our clients. First,
let us say a word about pre-October 8, 1949 transfers taking effect
at death. The Technical Changes Amendment prevents the appli-
cation of the Spiegel case ' to transfers made before October 8,
1949, the date upon which the Conference Committee agreed to
the contents of the Technical Changes Act. In addition it limits
application of Helvering v. Hallock and Klein v. U. S.10 with re-
spect to pre-October 8, 1949 transfers. The application of the
Spiegel case is prevented as to transfers made before October 8,
1949 by the removal of possibilities of reverter by operation of
law from consideration, as a ground for taxing irrevocable life-
time transfers. Therefore, if a transferor has in the past trans-
ferred property into an irrevocable trust and has provided for
payment of remainders to his children or their issue after his
death, the fact that if he should leave neither children nor grand-
children surviving him at the date of his death and that the prop-
erty would return to his estate by operation of state law, will
not alone make the transfer taxable if he is in fact survived by
either children or grandchildren.
Application of the Hallock and Klein cases is also limited as
to pre-October 8, 1949 transfers. In these cases it was provided
that the express retention of a reversionary interest will not make
a transfer taxable unless the value of the reversionary interest is
worth more than five per cent of the value of the property trans-
ferred. The value of such reversionary interest is to be determined
as of immediately before the death of the decedent.
EFFECT OF 1949 AMENDMENT
Second, let us consider the effect of the amendment on trans-
fers made after October 8, 1949. The prospective influence of the
amendment is to give full force and effect to the Klein, Hallock and
Spiegel cases and to several others as well, for all future interests,
i.e., those made after October 8, 1949. Let us spell this out. The
prospective application of the amendment keeps and affirms the
pre-existing rule that only when the death of the transferor is
the operative factor ending his reversionary interest and confer-
ring an interest in the estate on the beneficiary, does the property
transferred become includible in the estate of the transferor. In
addition, by abolishing the doctrine of Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Company, an estate tax can be levied on a parent-transferor, even
though the parent parted with all his interest, present and pros-
"Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 UJ. S. 701 (1949).
"0283 U. S. 231 (1931).
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pective, in the property. You recall the old estate tax regulation
which established the test in determining whether a transfer is
taxable as one intended to take effect at death. That test was
contained in the requirement that "the decedent or his estate
possesses any right or interest in the property (whether arising
by the express terms of the instrument of transfer or otherwise)."
In other words, under the prospective amendment, it is no longer
necessary for the transferor to have even a reversionary interest.
We now look only to the persons who are to receive the possession
or enjoyment to determine whether or not the tax applies. If any
person must survive the transferor to obtain possession or enjoy-
ment, the interest passing to such person is taxable. There is one
exception to this. The law specifically provides that there is no
basis for taxing any interest of which possession or enjoyment
could be obtained by any beneficiary during the decedent's life
through the exercise of a power of appointment as defined in Sec-
tion 811 (f) (2), which, in fact was exercisable immediately prior
to the decedent's death. This has reference to transfers by the
decedent under which he grants a power of appointment to others
and makes it exercisable by them alone. This seems to overrule
the decision of the Supreme Court of Goldstone v. U. S.11
We do not have time to consider specific trust provisions as
to whether or not they will or will not be subjected to the Federal
Estate Tax. In fairness to our life underwriter friends, let us
point to a tax trap in their field. The 1949 amendment and its
effect on intervivos gifts of life insurance must await the develop-
ing decisions of the Tax Court and the District Courts. But there
are some decisions on the payment of life insurance premiums
which point to a tax trap. You recall the cases holding that the
payment of a premium on a policy by one other than the owner
constitutes in part a gift of a part interest, and therefore does
not come within the annual gift tax exclusion, except to the extent
that such payment increases the cash surrender value. 12 These
cases suggest the likelihood that the Commissioner will take the
position that a gift of a policy by an insured (even it found
not to be made in contemplation of death) may nevertheless be
held to be, at least in part, a transfer taking effect at death, since
to the extent that the proceeds exceed the cash surrender value, the
possession and enjoyment of the gift can be obtained only by the
donee surviving the decedent. Such a tax gathering construction
of the Technical Changes Act certainly should not justify inclu-
sion of more than the difference between the cash surrender value
and the face amount of the policy. We all know that the donee
has immediate possession and enjoyment of the cash surrender
value. The Commissioner might well be successful in taxing the
excess which comes into possession and enjoyment on the donor-
insured's death.
,325 U. S. 687 (1945).
,Chittenden v. Hassett, District Court of Mass., 42-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 10,047.
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FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
ESTATE PLANNING
HOWARD E. PARKS*
of the Denver Bar
The treatment of closely-held businesses, whether the form
be that of sole proprietorship, partnership or corporation, presents
complex problems to the estate planner.
One of the first things for consideration is whether the present
form of organization should be changed. This will involve a com-
parison of the income tax burden under the present form with
the tax burden under the proposed form. With the existing excess
profits tax, it is entirely possible that the form can be changed to
advantage if it presently is a corporation, and consideration should
be given to the possibility of converting into a sole proprietorship or
partnership. In this connection, not only must the rate of taxes
on current income be taken into consideration, but also capital
gain or loss upon the dissolution of the corporation. Generally
speaking, the formation of a corporation in lieu of a sole proprie-
torship or partnership, does not give rise to capital gain or loss
problems.
For a number of reasons the estate planner's problems are
eased when the organization is in the form of a corporation. There
is less hesitancy in attempting to continue the business by reason,
first, of the absence of individual liability, and, secondly, because
its continuity of existence, regardless of the death of the stock-
holders, simplifies the transition upon death. The corporate form
may give rise to tax economies during life and after death by
virtue of the ability, through payment of salaries and rent and
by not paying dividends, to make a division of the corporate in-
come between the corporation and its stockholders so as to mini-
mize the over-all tax. Failure to pay out profits as dividends should
be in the light of Sec. 102 of the Internal Revenue Code, having
to do with improper accumulation of surplus.
More often than not the man who has built up a business is
reluctant to see the business terminated at or shortly after his
death, but frequently he does not fully appreciate the extent to
which he is the business. Before any serious consideration is given
to plans for perpetuating the business, a careful survey should be
made to determine whether there exists in the business, personnel
which is probably capable of providing profitable management.
If there are several individuals active in management, it is en-
tirely possible that those remaining can carry on the business
profitably, and it will not be necessary that the family of the one
dying retire from participation in the profits of the business. It
should be recognized from the outset, however, that conflicts are
likely to arise between the non-working owners of a business and
those whose personal efforts are producing the profits to be di-
* Vice President and Trust Officer of the Denver National Bank.
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vided, and for that reason some suitable arrangement, must be
made to adjust the salaries or other withdrawals of the survivors
to compensate for this factor. Accordingly, if it is desired that
the business be carried on, the necessary arrangements should be
made to assure capable management, and some satisfactory plan
should be devised with that management for division of profits and
compensation for services.
BuY AND SELL AGREEMENTS
In the event it appears desirable to retire the interest of the
decedent, it is usually preferable to have a definite pre-arrange-
ment among the interested parties. It is customary in such cases
to enter into buy and sell agreements among the proprietors. These
agreements may consist of an option in the survivor to buy the
interest of the decedent. Such arrangements, of course, are unsat-
isfactory to the decedent's estate for the reason that there is no
compulsion upon the survivors to exercise the option and the es-
tate may own a proprietary interest with, perhaps, all of the prob-
lems of a minority owner. In any event there is no assurance under
this plan that funds will be available for payment of death tax
and expenses of administration. The parties may prefer to enter
into a binding agreement whereby the survivors agree to buy the
interest of the decedent, but, of course, they should be aware of
the dangers inherent in a commitment to purchase at an indeter-
minate future time when circumstances might be such as to
threaten the solvency of the survivors. Generally speaking, how-
eve-, if proper funding arrangements are made, so that the funds
will be available upon the death of the decedent to pay the bulk
of the purchase price, the binding agreement is likely to be the
most satisfactory solution.
Such agreements, whether options or binding agreements,
should provide a method for fixing the purchase price. Custom-
ary provisions for this purpose are book value, a stated price
agreed in advance, a stated price to be varied from time to time
by periodic agreement, appraisal at death, or a formula frequently
related to book value, plus an adjustment for good-will value.
Obviously, the less flexible the method of determining the purchase
price, the less likely it is that the price arrived at by it, will closely
approximate true value.
One important consideration is to arrange, if possible, that
the purchase price fixed shall be fully effective to determine the
value of the business interest for Federal Estate Tax purposes.
In the first place, if there is any element of gift between the pro-
prietors, e.g., if there is some family or other relationship between
them whereby they are not dealing at arms length with each other,
the Federal Estate Tax examiner is quite likely to reject the pur-
chase price fixed in the agreement as being binding upon him. Of
course, the estate tax examiner must take into consideration the
existence of an agreement, since its existence is a factor in arriv-
ing at fair market value,' but such arrangement as a first refusal
' Estate of Matthews, 3 T. C. 525 (Dec., 1944).
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will not be conclusive, for the reason that there is no assurance
that the survivors will exercise their right. In order for a price
set forth in the buy and sell agreement to be controlling on the
Federal government, it must impose an effective barrier to sale
by the decedent during his lifetime at a greater price than that
which would be effective on his death.2 The Federal courts have
held that if the decedent had the right to sell his interest, during
his lifetime, free from the buy and sell agreement, the fair market
value just before death is the proper figure to include in the gross
estate. 3 The decedent's estate also must be compelled to sell under
the agreement in order for the price under the agreement to be
fully effective. 4 Since most state death taxes are on the right to
receive, the state courts have tended to accord less significance to
buy and sell agreements than the Federal courts.
USE OF LIFE INSURANCE TO PROVIDE FUNDS
Having arrived at a plan for a buy and sell agreement which
points the way to the price to be paid, and having arranged the
agreement in such a way that it is reasonably sure to be control-
ling for tax purposes, the next important problem is how to make
the funds available at the proper time.
Obviously, life insurance is the most satisfactory solution
since its proceeds are available simultaneously with the event
which gives rise to the need for the funds.
WHO SHOULD PAY THE PREMIUMS?
Having decided upon life insurance as the means for providing
a part or all of the purchase price, the next question is how the
premiums should be paid. If paid by a partnership, the partner
may be indirectly paying a part of the premium on the policy on
his own life so that a corresponding part of the policy would be
includible in his gross estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes.
This would seem quite clearly to be true if the premiums are
treated on the books of the partnership as an expense of doing
business or as a reduction of profits before division. The partner-
ship books could, of course, be kept so that it clearly appears that
no part of any premiums on the policy on the life of a particular
partner are paid from his interest in partnership earnings or
capital, but that the only premiums he pays, directly or indirectly,
are on policies on the lives of his partners.
Some think there is danger in having a corporation controlled
by a single stockholder pay the premiums on a policy on his life,
because the Commissioner might contend that for purposes of
taxation the corporation is the stockholder's alter ego, hence he
indirectly pays the premiums. In this event there is a possibility
that both the policy and the stock would be included in the gross
estate of the deceased stockholder. If the corporation pays the
SLamb v. Sugden, 82 F. 2d 166 (1936).
*Estate of Matthews, op. cit.
Lamb v. Sugden, op. cit.
'Sec. 811(g), 1. R. C.
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premiums, and the payment of premiums is for the benefit of the
stockholder's estate rather than for the benefit of the corporation,
the payment may be construed as the payment of a dividend.
In order to avoid the problems just alluded to, the customary
plan is for each of the proprietors to take out on the lives of his
co-proprietors insurance policies and to pay the premiums on such
policies. In this way, upon the death of the insured, the survivors
receive the proceeds free from income tax,6 and there is no danger
that the proceeds of the policies will be included in the gross estate
of the decedent.
DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
The next step is to determine who shall be the beneficiary of
the insurance. If the policies are payable to the corporation or
partnership, the proceeds will tend to increase the value of the
decedent's interest in the business, frequently necessitating the
inclusion of both the proprietary interest and, indirectly, a part
of the insurance in the gross estate. Arrangements are made fre-
quently to have the policy paid to the corporation, which in turn
agrees to retire the decedent's stock. In most states such retire-
ment can take place only out of surplus, and if surplus is deficient
or non-existent, the contract cannot be fulfilled. It has been held
that a contract by the corporation to retire stock, regardless of
the condition of its surplus, is void and that no rights flow from
the contract.7 In order to avoid this, there frequently is an agree-
ment among the stockholders to cause the corporation to retire
the stock. This agreement, of course, can be carried out only if
the requisite surplus is available. There is also the danger, under
certain circumstances, if only a part of a stockholder's stock is
retired, that the transaction will be treated as a taxable dividend
under Sec. 115(g) of the Internal Revenue Code. Congress, in
1950, amended this section to make it possible, in certain limited
cases, to retire sufficient stock to pay inheritance and estate taxes
without the transaction being treated as a dividend, but this
relief provision fails to cover the situations of many proprietors.
Another objection to having the corporation retire the stock
of the decedent is that it becomes treasury stock, and while the
surviving stockholders have caused the corporation to pay premi-
ums on the policy, yet the insurance proceeds are not reflected as
a part of their basis for the stock retired. The effect of this stock
retirement is to reduce the outstanding stock, and this enhances
the value of the remaining stock with no corresponding increase
in income tax basis; accordingly, there will be a larger capital
gain tax upon sale by the survivors. If the transaction is han-
dled entirely outside the corporation, the surviving stockholders
will have as a basis the purchase price of the stock, which will
be derived in part from insurance proceeds. It must be recog-
nized, however, that in these days of high taxes it is sometimes
6Sec. 22(b) (1), I. R. C.
Topeka, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, (N. Y.) 163 N. E. 735.
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difficult, if not impossible, for the individual stockholders to pro-
vide, after individual income taxes, enough available personal
funds to insure the lives of the co-proprietors in an amount suffi-
cient to serve the purpose, and for that reason there is no other
practical way than to cause the corporation to pay the premiums
and be the beneficiary of the policies.
Frequently, an arrangement is made so that the policies on
the life of each proprietor are made payable to his wife, or some
other member of his family, with the agreement providing that
the surviving proprietors will receive the interest of the deceased
proprietor in the business. This method, while having the merit
that policy options can be made available to the beneficiary simply,
has the serious defect that the business interest of the deceased
proprietor has never passed through the probate court and hence
has never been subjected to the claims of creditors nor have the
proceeds of the insurance been subjected to such claims. In the
event the deceased proprietor is insolvent at death, his co-propri-
etors have acquired a doubtful right to his interest.
Occasionally, such policies are made payable to the surviving
stockholder or partner as beneficiary. In this case, however, the
survivor holds the insurance proceeds and is in control of the
business interest. This plan has the defect that the creditors of
the survivor may intervene, or his position of being in control of
both the purchase price and the thing to be purchased may give
rise to delay or litigation.
To avoid the difficulties outlined above, the generally preferred
method of carrying out a stock purchase agreement is to have
the policies on the lives of the proprietors (in each case the pre-
miums being paid by the proprietors other than the insured pro-
prietor) payable to, or assigned to, a neutral trustee. If the busi-
ness organization is a corporation, the stock is likewise deposited
with the trustee in negotiable form. The trustee holds both the
stock and the insurance policies, and when a death occurs he
collects the insurance and receives from the survivors the notes,
or other consideration for the difference between the purchase
price and the insurance. He then delivers the stock to the survivor
and the insurance proceeds and the notes to the decedent's execu-
tor. Not only does this plan avoid the possibility of the decedent
making a sale, pledge or gift in violation of the agreement (the
possibility of which has much to do with the conclusiveness of
the price for Federal Estate Tax purposes), but the proceeds of
the sale are clearly subjected to the claims of creditors, and ques-
tions as to the title of the survivors to the decedent's interest are
eliminated.
PARTNERSHIPS AND SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS
In event the organization is a partnership, the procedure
would be much the same except that the trustee would deliver the
insurance proceeds and other consideration to the executor upon
receipt from the executor of a relinquishment of all claim to part-
nership assets, and deliver it to the survivor.
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The sole proprietotship is the most difficult form of organiza-
tion to deal with, whether it is to be sold or continued in existence.
In a very large percentage of the cases liquidation is the only
feasible solution because there are no key men in the business, or
members of the family, capable of continuing it for any length of
time. The executor named will not likely be willing to continue
operation over an extended period of time, unless the business is
also willed to him. If the operation of the business was a full-time
job for the decedent, it is likely to be the same for his executor.
In certain cases there will be key men in the business who are
capable of continuing its profitable management. In such case,
consideration should be given to a buy and sell agreement with
the key men, funded by life insurance. In some cases the net cost
to the employer of increasing salaries sufficiently to pay premiums
may not be prohibitive, after taking into consideration the owner's
income taxes. In many cases the sole proprietorship could be
converted into a partnership with the key men and the usual buy
and sell agreement used. Unless some arrangement is made for
a buy and sell agreement, then liquidation or sale of the sole pro-
prietorship by the executor appears the only alternative. If so,
the will should contain an adequate provision authorizing the execu-
tor to continue the business at the risk of the estate until such
time as sale or liquidation to advantage can take place. If the busi-
ness is likely to be continued for, any length of time, there should
be a specific provision in the will authorizing the executor to
change the form of organization so that the business may be oper-
ated from time to time under any of the three recognized forms
of organization.
It is obvious from the numerous questions touched upon, the
problems in estate planning respecting the sole proprietorship or
closely-held business interest are difficult. Many times it turns
out that there is no really satisfactory solution which will ade-
quately carry out the wishes of the owner. If a satisfactory solu-
tion is to be reached, it is most likely to be reached when a team
consisting of lawyer, accountant, life underwriter and trust officer
approach it together. It is quite possible that the trust officer
may make a substantial contribution to the efforts of the team,
because he has probably administered a very large proportion of
the various plans which may be proposed, and his practical ex-
perience may shed considerable light upon the feasibility of any
particular proposal.
BAR PRIMARY
The members of the Denver Bar Association were polled as to
the qualifications of those who had announced their candidacies
for judicial office on May 23, 1952. As a result of this primary,
the Denver Bar Association endorses and urges your support of
Philip B. Gilliam for Juvenile Court Judge, David Brofman for




MINING OPERATIONS-LATERAL SUPPORT FOR AD-
JOINING BUILDINGS (COLO FUEL AND IRON CORP. v.
SALARDINO). 1-Plaintiffs Salardino brought an action against
C. F. & I. to recover for damages to improvements on lands owned
by plaintiffs. It was alleged that as a result of the mining by the
defendant of coal deposits, owned by defendant, under or adjacent
to plaintiffs' land, said land subsided and that the improvements
thereon were thereby damaged in the amount of $7,500. By
amended complaint, the amount was raised to $15,000.
The complaint alleged that the defendant had done its mining
in "a careless, wrongful and negligent manner." To this allega-
tion defendant answered with a specific denial of negligence, and
with two affirmative defenses, neither of which seems to have
been decisive.
The evidence showed that defendant had mined its deposits
at a depth of about 80 feet, and that the workings were in the
vicinity of plaintiffs' lot lines extended vertically. The evidence
also showed that plaintiffs' land had subsided, and that as a result
thereof plaintiffs' improvements, including a building, were dam-
aged. There was no direct evidence showing damage to plaintiffs'
land in its natural state; all the evidence was introduced with
reference to damage to plaintiffs' improvements.
Defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds, in
part, that: (1) there was insufficient evidence of negligence to
allow the case to go to the jury, and failure to direct a verdict
for that reason; (12) the instruction which fixed the liability of
the defendant as absolute; and (3) defendant's instructions ten-
dered and refused. The motion was denied, and defendant appealed
from the judgment for the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court determined only the specifications of
points which related to the instructions given by the trial court.
These instructions were based upon a theory of absolute liability
resting upon defendant corporation for damage sustained by plain-
tiffs' building as a result of defendant's mining operation. The
Supreme Court held that in order for plaintiffs to recover for
damage to improvements, it was necessary for them to prove
negligence and that therefore it was reversible error for the trial
court to fail to instruct the jury to that effect.
There is probably no Colorado case directly in point. Neither
the Supreme Court (apparently) nor the writer has been able to
discover any Colorado decision decisive of the issues here involved.
In the reported case are a few Colorado cititations which, while
'Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. Salardino . ..... Colo .. ...... P. (1952);
1951-52 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 27, p. 367.
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not directly in point, serve to illustrate the distinction in the law
upon which this case was decided.
It seems to be well settled in Colorado that landowners are
under an absolute duty to conduct their mining operations in such a
manner that adjoining property will not be damaged.2 However,
this duty extends only to such damage as may occur to adjoining
property in its natural state.3 The duty may be avoided, appar-
ently, by the creation between the parties of a contract, express
or implied, by which the adjoining property owner waives his
right to support of his property. 4 There seems to have been no
such contract here.
One Colorado case, cited by the court, lends to the present
decision some color of precedence, although it is by way of dictum.,
In this case plaintiff's property was damaged by the subsidence
of his land. The subsidence was caused by the mining of coal
underneath plaintiff's land, the mining being done by defendant's
lessee. Defendant had known of its lessee's negligent mining,
and defendant had made use of the fruit of the operations. Plain-
tiff's improvements were damaged, and judgment for defendant
was reversed on the theory of negligence. This is a departure
from the theory of absolute liability which applies to damage to
the land in its natural state, as laid down in the Evans case. How-
ever, the Supreme Court, in the instant case, relied primarily on
foreign case law and text law in reaching its decision.
In a Montana case, Neyman v. Pincus,6 the court, in discuss-
ing the distinction between the duty of an excavating landowner
to provide lateral support for adjoining land and his duty to pro-
vide support for buildings and improvements upon adjoining land,
said that the natural right of support extends only to the land
itself and not to buildings placed on the land. In Michigan it
has been held that the duty which rests upon an excavating owner
to protect buildings on adjoining property is that of the exercise
of ordinary care.7 The general rule, therefore, at least outside
Colorado, seems to be that expressed by the cases cited by the
Supreme Court: The duty of support of buildings is one of ordi-
nary care, and negligence must be the basis of an action brought
for damage to buildings and improvements resulting from such
excavations. For a general discussion of the rule see 2 C. J. S.,
p. 6, et seq., and cases cited.
Applying this rule to the case in hand, it is fairly clear that
the instructions of the trial court were substantially in error. The
error was one of omission rather than commission. The court
failed, in its instructions, to present to the jury the issue of negli-
.-'Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023 (1925).
'Kirchof v. Sheets, 118 Colo. 244, 194 P. 2d 320 (1948); Evans Fuel Co. v.
Leyda, supra note 2.
4Campbell v. Louisville Mining Co., 39 Colo. 379, 89 P. 767 (1907).
IId. at 380.
683 Mont. 467, 267 P. 805 (1928).
'Horowitz v. Blay, 193' Mich. 493, 160 N. W. 438 (1916).
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gence. The court required the jury to find for the plaintiffs if
it found that the damage to plaintiffs' building resulted from the
subsidence of plaintiffs' land caused by defendant's excavations.
Although negligence was alleged by plaintiffs, and although appar-
ently there was substantial evidence showing negligence, the trial
court effectively negated all this work by its instructions, which
placed defendant's liability for damage to the building upon the
grounds of absolute liability. How often, cry the losers, is such
the fate of the hard working trial attorney!
An interesting sidelight is brought out in the report of this
case. It has little to do with the issues involved, but it should
stand as another of the oft-repeated warnings to. trial attorneys
to remember that the justices of the Supreme Court are neither
present at the trial, nor are they mind-readers, and that as a
result of these perhaps unfortunate circumstances, a clear, accu-
rate, and adequate record must be made for appeal purposes. In
this case there was only one map of defendant's underground
workings presented on appeal. In 19 pages of the record are
printed witness' testimony with regard to locations on the map.
The words "here" or "there" appear in the record more than 80
times. In no instance was there any indication in the record of
the places or locations on the map to which "here" or "there"
referred. As a result, to use the language of the Supreme Court,
the map was "wholly useless" on review. The map, and the testi-
mony in reference to it, and all the work that had been done pre-
paring the exhibit were largely wasted, because of the failure of
the attorneys who attempted to use the map and relative testimony
to indicate in the record the places to which reference was made.
Whether or not the failure of this exhibit to be of any use on
review made any difference in the outcome of the case is uncertain.
But whether it did or not, the fact that this effort was wasted,
and the fact that the effect, if any, of the exhibit was wholly
lost upon review, should serve to caution others against making
the same kind of mistake.
WANTLAND L. SANDEL, JR.
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